spdf/elektron
Archived
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues 4 Pull requests 1 Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity

Unit testing for def/ module.

Browse source 
Added unit tests to test code in def/ module.
This commit is contained in:
Pradyumna Kaushik 2019-10-12 06:48:45 +00:00
parent e24b8a08c9
commit bac60e872a
396 changed files with 83991 additions and 13209 deletions
Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

11
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build !amd64,!ppc64le gccgo appengine
package poly1305
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) mac { return mac{newMACGeneric(key)} }

80
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go generated vendored
View file

@ -2,21 +2,19 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
/*
Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
messages with the same key.
Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
directly.
*/
// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as
// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf.
//
// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an
// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a
// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different
// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other
// messages with the same key.
//
// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was
// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce.
// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified
// directly.
package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305"
import "crypto/subtle"
@ -31,3 +29,55 @@ func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
Sum(&tmp, m, key)
return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1
}
// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication
// tag of all data written to it with the given key.
// This allows writing the message progressively instead
// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use
// the Sum function instead.
//
// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating
// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker
// to forge messages at will.
func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC {
return &MAC{
mac: newMAC(key),
finalized: false,
}
}
// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag
// of the data written to it.
//
// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations,
// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security.
// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling
// Sum causes it to panic.
type MAC struct {
mac // platform-dependent implementation
finalized bool
}
// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return.
func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize }
// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code.
// It never returns an error.
//
// It must not be called after the first call of Sum.
func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
if h.finalized {
panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum")
}
return h.mac.Write(p)
}
// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the
// message authentication code.
func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
var mac [TagSize]byte
h.mac.Sum(&mac)
h.finalized = true
return append(b, mac[:]...)
}

60
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go generated vendored
View file

@ -6,17 +6,63 @@
package poly1305
// This function is implemented in sum_amd64.s
//go:noescape
func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
//go:noescape
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
poly1305(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(m)
h.Sum(out)
}
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
initialize(&h.state, key)
return
}
type mac struct {
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
h.offset = 0
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
p = p[nn:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
}
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
state := h.state
if h.offset > 0 {
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
}
finalize(out, &state)
}

61
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s generated vendored
View file

@ -58,20 +58,17 @@ DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
// func poly1305(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key)
TEXT ·poly1305(SB), $0-32
MOVQ out+0(FP), DI
MOVQ m+8(FP), SI
MOVQ mlen+16(FP), R15
MOVQ key+24(FP), AX
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
MOVQ msg_base+8(FP), SI
MOVQ msg_len+16(FP), R15
MOVQ 0(AX), R11
MOVQ 8(AX), R12
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R11 // r0
ANDQ ·poly1305Mask<>+8(SB), R12 // r1
XORQ R8, R8 // h0
XORQ R9, R9 // h1
XORQ R10, R10 // h2
MOVQ 0(DI), R8 // h0
MOVQ 8(DI), R9 // h1
MOVQ 16(DI), R10 // h2
MOVQ 24(DI), R11 // r0
MOVQ 32(DI), R12 // r1
CMPQ R15, $16
JB bytes_between_0_and_15
@ -109,16 +106,42 @@ flush_buffer:
JMP multiply
done:
MOVQ R8, AX
MOVQ R9, BX
MOVQ R8, 0(DI)
MOVQ R9, 8(DI)
MOVQ R10, 16(DI)
RET
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
MOVQ state+0(FP), DI
MOVQ key+8(FP), SI
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
MOVOU 0(SI), X0
MOVOU 16(SI), X1
MOVOU ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), X2
PAND X2, X0
MOVOU X0, 24(DI)
MOVOU X1, 40(DI)
RET
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
MOVQ tag+0(FP), DI
MOVQ state+8(FP), SI
MOVQ 0(SI), AX
MOVQ 8(SI), BX
MOVQ 16(SI), CX
MOVQ AX, R8
MOVQ BX, R9
SUBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB, AX
SBBQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, BX
SBBQ $3, R10
SBBQ $3, CX
CMOVQCS R8, AX
CMOVQCS R9, BX
MOVQ key+24(FP), R8
ADDQ 16(R8), AX
ADCQ 24(R8), BX
ADDQ 40(SI), AX
ADCQ 48(SI), BX
MOVQ AX, 0(DI)
MOVQ BX, 8(DI)

121
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ref.go → vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go generated vendored
View file

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
@ -6,21 +6,79 @@ package poly1305
import "encoding/binary"
const (
msgBlock = uint32(1 << 24)
finalBlock = uint32(0)
)
// sumGeneric generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and
// puts the 16-byte result into out. This is the generic implementation of
// Sum and should be called if no assembly implementation is available.
func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
var (
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 uint32 // the hash accumulators
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 uint64 // the r part of the key
)
h := newMACGeneric(key)
h.Write(msg)
h.Sum(out)
}
r0 = uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff)
r1 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03)
r2 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff)
r3 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff)
r4 = uint64((binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff)
func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) {
h.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h.r[1] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffff03
h.r[2] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffc0ff
h.r[3] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3f03fff
h.r[4] = (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:]) >> 8) & 0x00fffff
h.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:])
h.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])
h.s[2] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])
h.s[3] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])
return
}
type macGeneric struct {
h, r [5]uint32
s [4]uint32
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
h.offset = 0
updateGeneric(h.buffer[:], msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
updateGeneric(p, msgBlock, &(h.h), &(h.r))
p = p[nn:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
}
func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
H, R := h.h, h.r
if h.offset > 0 {
var buffer [TagSize]byte
copy(buffer[:], h.buffer[:h.offset])
buffer[h.offset] = 1 // invariant: h.offset < TagSize
updateGeneric(buffer[:], finalBlock, &H, &R)
}
finalizeGeneric(out, &H, &(h.s))
}
func updateGeneric(msg []byte, flag uint32, h, r *[5]uint32) {
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
r0, r1, r2, r3, r4 := uint64(r[0]), uint64(r[1]), uint64(r[2]), uint64(r[3]), uint64(r[4])
R1, R2, R3, R4 := r1*5, r2*5, r3*5, r4*5
for len(msg) >= TagSize {
@ -29,7 +87,7 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | (1 << 24)
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(msg[12:]) >> 8) | flag
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
@ -52,36 +110,11 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
msg = msg[TagSize:]
}
if len(msg) > 0 {
var block [TagSize]byte
off := copy(block[:], msg)
block[off] = 0x01
h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4] = h0, h1, h2, h3, h4
}
// h += msg
h0 += binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[0:]) & 0x3ffffff
h1 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[3:]) >> 2) & 0x3ffffff
h2 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[6:]) >> 4) & 0x3ffffff
h3 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[9:]) >> 6) & 0x3ffffff
h4 += (binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(block[12:]) >> 8)
// h *= r
d0 := (uint64(h0) * r0) + (uint64(h1) * R4) + (uint64(h2) * R3) + (uint64(h3) * R2) + (uint64(h4) * R1)
d1 := (d0 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r1) + (uint64(h1) * r0) + (uint64(h2) * R4) + (uint64(h3) * R3) + (uint64(h4) * R2)
d2 := (d1 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r2) + (uint64(h1) * r1) + (uint64(h2) * r0) + (uint64(h3) * R4) + (uint64(h4) * R3)
d3 := (d2 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r3) + (uint64(h1) * r2) + (uint64(h2) * r1) + (uint64(h3) * r0) + (uint64(h4) * R4)
d4 := (d3 >> 26) + (uint64(h0) * r4) + (uint64(h1) * r3) + (uint64(h2) * r2) + (uint64(h3) * r1) + (uint64(h4) * r0)
// h %= p
h0 = uint32(d0) & 0x3ffffff
h1 = uint32(d1) & 0x3ffffff
h2 = uint32(d2) & 0x3ffffff
h3 = uint32(d3) & 0x3ffffff
h4 = uint32(d4) & 0x3ffffff
h0 += uint32(d4>>26) * 5
h1 += h0 >> 26
h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff
}
func finalizeGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[5]uint32, s *[4]uint32) {
h0, h1, h2, h3, h4 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4]
// h %= p reduction
h2 += h1 >> 26
@ -123,13 +156,13 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
// s: the s part of the key
// tag = (h + s) % (2^128)
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:]))
t := uint64(h0) + uint64(s[0])
h0 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:])) + (t >> 32)
t = uint64(h1) + uint64(s[1]) + (t >> 32)
h1 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:])) + (t >> 32)
t = uint64(h2) + uint64(s[2]) + (t >> 32)
h2 = uint32(t)
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:])) + (t >> 32)
t = uint64(h3) + uint64(s[3]) + (t >> 32)
h3 = uint32(t)
binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:], h0)

6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go generated vendored
View file

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x gccgo appengine nacl
// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x,!ppc64le gccgo appengine nacl
package poly1305
@ -10,5 +10,7 @@ package poly1305
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
sumGeneric(out, msg, key)
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(msg)
h.Sum(out)
}

68
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
package poly1305
//go:noescape
func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
//go:noescape
func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
//go:noescape
func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
// Sum generates an authenticator for m using a one-time key and puts the
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h := newMAC(key)
h.Write(m)
h.Sum(out)
}
func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
initialize(&h.state, key)
return
}
type mac struct {
state [7]uint64 // := uint64{ h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, pad0, pad1 }
buffer [TagSize]byte
offset int
}
func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
n = len(p)
if h.offset > 0 {
remaining := TagSize - h.offset
if n < remaining {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
return n, nil
}
copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p[:remaining])
p = p[remaining:]
h.offset = 0
update(&h.state, h.buffer[:])
}
if nn := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); nn > 0 {
update(&h.state, p[:nn])
p = p[nn:]
}
if len(p) > 0 {
h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p)
}
return n, nil
}
func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) {
state := h.state
if h.offset > 0 {
update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset])
}
finalize(out, &state)
}

247
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s generated vendored Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine
#include "textflag.h"
// This was ported from the amd64 implementation.
#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2) \
MOVD (msg), t0; \
MOVD 8(msg), t1; \
MOVD $1, t2; \
ADDC t0, h0, h0; \
ADDE t1, h1, h1; \
ADDE t2, h2; \
ADD $16, msg
#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) \
MULLD r0, h0, t0; \
MULLD r0, h1, t4; \
MULHDU r0, h0, t1; \
MULHDU r0, h1, t5; \
ADDC t4, t1, t1; \
MULLD r0, h2, t2; \
ADDZE t5; \
MULHDU r1, h0, t4; \
MULLD r1, h0, h0; \
ADD t5, t2, t2; \
ADDC h0, t1, t1; \
MULLD h2, r1, t3; \
ADDZE t4, h0; \
MULHDU r1, h1, t5; \
MULLD r1, h1, t4; \
ADDC t4, t2, t2; \
ADDE t5, t3, t3; \
ADDC h0, t2, t2; \
MOVD $-4, t4; \
MOVD t0, h0; \
MOVD t1, h1; \
ADDZE t3; \
ANDCC $3, t2, h2; \
AND t2, t4, t0; \
ADDC t0, h0, h0; \
ADDE t3, h1, h1; \
SLD $62, t3, t4; \
SRD $2, t2; \
ADDZE h2; \
OR t4, t2, t2; \
SRD $2, t3; \
ADDC t2, h0, h0; \
ADDE t3, h1, h1; \
ADDZE h2
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF
DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16
// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte)
TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4
MOVD msg_len+16(FP), R5
MOVD 0(R3), R8 // h0
MOVD 8(R3), R9 // h1
MOVD 16(R3), R10 // h2
MOVD 24(R3), R11 // r0
MOVD 32(R3), R12 // r1
CMP R5, $16
BLT bytes_between_0_and_15
loop:
POLY1305_ADD(R4, R8, R9, R10, R20, R21, R22)
multiply:
POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R16, R17, R18, R14, R20, R21)
ADD $-16, R5
CMP R5, $16
BGE loop
bytes_between_0_and_15:
CMP $0, R5
BEQ done
MOVD $0, R16 // h0
MOVD $0, R17 // h1
flush_buffer:
CMP R5, $8
BLE just1
MOVD $8, R21
SUB R21, R5, R21
// Greater than 8 -- load the rightmost remaining bytes in msg
// and put into R17 (h1)
MOVD (R4)(R21), R17
MOVD $16, R22
// Find the offset to those bytes
SUB R5, R22, R22
SLD $3, R22
// Shift to get only the bytes in msg
SRD R22, R17, R17
// Put 1 at high end
MOVD $1, R23
SLD $3, R21
SLD R21, R23, R23
OR R23, R17, R17
// Remainder is 8
MOVD $8, R5
just1:
CMP R5, $8
BLT less8
// Exactly 8
MOVD (R4), R16
CMP $0, R17
// Check if we've already set R17; if not
// set 1 to indicate end of msg.
BNE carry
MOVD $1, R17
BR carry
less8:
MOVD $0, R16 // h0
MOVD $0, R22 // shift count
CMP R5, $4
BLT less4
MOVWZ (R4), R16
ADD $4, R4
ADD $-4, R5
MOVD $32, R22
less4:
CMP R5, $2
BLT less2
MOVHZ (R4), R21
SLD R22, R21, R21
OR R16, R21, R16
ADD $16, R22
ADD $-2, R5
ADD $2, R4
less2:
CMP $0, R5
BEQ insert1
MOVBZ (R4), R21
SLD R22, R21, R21
OR R16, R21, R16
ADD $8, R22
insert1:
// Insert 1 at end of msg
MOVD $1, R21
SLD R22, R21, R21
OR R16, R21, R16
carry:
// Add new values to h0, h1, h2
ADDC R16, R8
ADDE R17, R9
ADDE $0, R10
MOVD $16, R5
ADD R5, R4
BR multiply
done:
// Save h0, h1, h2 in state
MOVD R8, 0(R3)
MOVD R9, 8(R3)
MOVD R10, 16(R3)
RET
// func initialize(state *[7]uint64, key *[32]byte)
TEXT ·initialize(SB), $0-16
MOVD state+0(FP), R3
MOVD key+8(FP), R4
// state[0...7] is initialized with zero
// Load key
MOVD 0(R4), R5
MOVD 8(R4), R6
MOVD 16(R4), R7
MOVD 24(R4), R8
// Address of key mask
MOVD $·poly1305Mask<>(SB), R9
// Save original key in state
MOVD R7, 40(R3)
MOVD R8, 48(R3)
// Get mask
MOVD (R9), R7
MOVD 8(R9), R8
// And with key
AND R5, R7, R5
AND R6, R8, R6
// Save masked key in state
MOVD R5, 24(R3)
MOVD R6, 32(R3)
RET
// func finalize(tag *[TagSize]byte, state *[7]uint64)
TEXT ·finalize(SB), $0-16
MOVD tag+0(FP), R3
MOVD state+8(FP), R4
// Get h0, h1, h2 from state
MOVD 0(R4), R5
MOVD 8(R4), R6
MOVD 16(R4), R7
// Save h0, h1
MOVD R5, R8
MOVD R6, R9
MOVD $3, R20
MOVD $-1, R21
SUBC $-5, R5
SUBE R21, R6
SUBE R20, R7
MOVD $0, R21
SUBZE R21
// Check for carry
CMP $0, R21
ISEL $2, R5, R8, R5
ISEL $2, R6, R9, R6
MOVD 40(R4), R8
MOVD 48(R4), R9
ADDC R8, R5
ADDE R9, R6
MOVD R5, 0(R3)
MOVD R6, 8(R3)
RET

17
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go generated vendored
View file

@ -6,16 +6,9 @@
package poly1305
// hasVectorFacility reports whether the machine supports
// the vector facility (vx).
func hasVectorFacility() bool
// hasVMSLFacility reports whether the machine supports
// Vector Multiply Sum Logical (VMSL).
func hasVMSLFacility() bool
var hasVX = hasVectorFacility()
var hasVMSL = hasVMSLFacility()
import (
"golang.org/x/sys/cpu"
)
// poly1305vx is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector
// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is
@ -33,12 +26,12 @@ func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte)
// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same
// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will.
func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
if hasVX {
if cpu.S390X.HasVX {
var mPtr *byte
if len(m) > 0 {
mPtr = &m[0]
}
if hasVMSL && len(m) > 256 {
if cpu.S390X.HasVXE && len(m) > 256 {
poly1305vmsl(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)
} else {
poly1305vx(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key)

22
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s generated vendored
View file

@ -376,25 +376,3 @@ b1:
MOVD $0, R3
BR multiply
TEXT ·hasVectorFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x40, R1
BEQ novector
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novector
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novector:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET

22
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s generated vendored
View file

@ -907,25 +907,3 @@ square:
MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9)
REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5)
BR next
TEXT ·hasVMSLFacility(SB), NOSPLIT, $24-1
MOVD $x-24(SP), R1
XC $24, 0(R1), 0(R1) // clear the storage
MOVD $2, R0 // R0 is the number of double words stored -1
WORD $0xB2B01000 // STFLE 0(R1)
XOR R0, R0 // reset the value of R0
MOVBZ z-8(SP), R1
AND $0x01, R1
BEQ novmsl
vectorinstalled:
// check if the vector instruction has been enabled
VLEIB $0, $0xF, V16
VLGVB $0, V16, R1
CMPBNE R1, $0xF, novmsl
MOVB $1, ret+0(FP) // have vx
RET
novmsl:
MOVB $0, ret+0(FP) // no vx
RET